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Holding Government Accountable:
The Amended Freedom of
Information Act
An Article in Honor of Fred Rodell
Elias Clarkt
On September 1, 1974, Fred Rodell retired from the faculty of the
Yale Law School. His friends find it hard to believe. Retirement says
something about the passage of time, and Fred has always been ob-
livious to clock or calendar. He thinks young. Throughout his 41
years on the faculty most of his best friends were students. Until a
series of ailments slowed him down a few years ago, he could com-
pete with the best of them at golf, tennis, fly-casting, mountain climb-
ing, bridge, and rhyming a limerick. There is nothing halfway about
Fred. He doesn't have one dog at a time; he has 13. He buys a camera
and a year later he publishes a handsome edition of colored photo-
graphs-beautiful women, of course.1 He delights with his wit, dazzles
with his insights, and shocks with his criticism. Such vitality can't be
retired.
. But Fred has in fact done it. He is as feisty as ever, but he aches in
too many places to find fun in teaching any more and so he has quit.
Fred thus joins a group of the School's best teachers who either have
retired in the last few years or will do so in the near future. The
Editors have dedicated this issue to that group, and it has fallen to
me to pay tribute to Fred. I took on the assignment gladly. Now, I
find the Editors have stacked the deck against me. Tributes come in
two forms. The first describes the man and his work. Fred has already
received this treatment in an affectionate statement from his long-time
friend, Justice William 0. Douglas, in Issue One of this volume.2 The
other alternative is the scholarly article solemnly dedicated to the
honoree. What delicious irony. Fred has never pulled a punch in let-
ting everyone know his contempt for law journal articles. The average
author, he has written, "is peculiarly able to say nothing with an air
t Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Yes, Fred, a footnote, but you don't want to deprive the reader of an opportunity to
look at your book, F. RODELL, HER INFINITE VARIETY (1966).
2. Douglas, Foreword, 84 YALE L.J. 1 (1974).
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of great importance ... an elephant trying to swat a fly,"3 who produces
"turgid, legaldegooky garbage." A law journal article to honor Fred
Rodell? Better to give an asthmatic a bouquet of ragweed. Yet the
Editors have left me no choice. If by this betrayal, Fred, I have lost
your good opinion, allow me two brief comments by way of explana-
tion in the hope that I can retain your friendship.
First, in your putdown of the law journals you left a crack in the
door.
With law as the only alternative to force as a means of solving the
myriad problems of the world, it seems to me that the articulate
among the clan of lawyers might, in their writings, be more point-
edly aware of those problems, might recognize that the use of law
to help toward their solution is the only excuse for the law's ex-
istence, instead of blithely continuing to make mountain after
mountain out of tiresome, technical molehills.5
The downfall of the last two presidents has highlighted one problem
of growing significance: the isolation and insulation of our government
-now encompassing approximately 2,800,000 civilian workers-from
the people. Individuals in this vast bureaucracy can destroy the world
by a wrong decision, while legions of nameless, faceless middle-level
officials control such important if less cosmic questions as whose tax
return to audit, what food is fit, whose phone to tap, the quantum
of exhaust we can tolerate, which Monday in February will be decreed
Abraham Washington's birthday, and on and on and on.
My topic, which I hope meets your criterion, Fred, is "the use of
law to help toward the solution" of this problem through the Freedom
of Information Act of July 4, 19677 (the Act) and the Amendments
to it which become effective February 19 of this year.8 This statute
is founded upon the philosophy that because governmental decisions
belong to the public, the people, as of right, may claim access to them.
The Rodellian prescription for the law's failures is to purge its lan-
gnage of all metaphysical refinements and make it understandable to
the nonlawyer.9 As a necessary first step, the Freedom of Information
3. Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REv. 279-80 (1962).
4. Id. at 288.
5. Id. at 284.
6. 1975 Woau ALMANAC & BOOK oF FAcTs 96.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
8. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 [hereinafter cited as Amend-
ments).
9. Throughout his career as a teacher, Fred stressed over and again that a lawyer must
communicate in a language that is clear and understandable. The fullest development of
his arguments appears in F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYEmsl (2d ed. 1957). Unfortunate-
ly, few of us are able to match his grace of style.
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Act lets the citizen strip away the secrecy that surrounds the law-
making process and discover who is making the law, for what pur-
poses, to affect whom.
My second explanatory comment is to disclaim the phrase "law
journal article" as a proper label for my efforts. My purpose is less
grand. The law is still developing-the tentative regulations covering
the new Amendments, for instance, are not due until mid-February,
after this manuscript has left my hands-and therefore a discussion of
the subject in depth is premature. The new Amendments do, however,
bring a pause in the flow of litigation while those interested review
where they stand under the amended statute. I want simply to com-
ment on the first seven years of experience under the Act and to
applaud the results that have been achieved, and then to make a few
predictions about the effect of the Amendments in the future.
If, Fred, on peeking ahead you find an infrequent footnote, a poly-
syllabic word or two and an occasional circumlocution, stop right
here. Alas, by your definition, you have here some "legal writing,"
and you know it's spinach. I got into this project to honor you. Let
the effort rather than the text stand as a measure of my affection.
I. The First Seven Years of Experience under the Act
A. Passage and Reception
Despite its symbolically significant date of signing, the text of the
Freedom of Information Act of July 4, 1967, does not suggest a call
to arms, much less a modem Magna Carta. The language is technical
rather than inspirational and provides none of the raw material for
headlines. In fact, the Act has from the time of its enactment evoked
a subdued and often skeptical reaction; its successes have come gradu-
ally and its startling disclosures only recently.
For purposes of description the Act (which applies only to the ex-
ecutive branch of the federal government) may be divided into three
categories of provisions: those which require the agencies to give
notice of what their files contain; those which grant to a person a
right of access to the files and a remedy if the right is refused; and
those which exempt certain information from disclosure.
First, to help searchers bewildered by the bureaucratic labyrinth
discover where information is located and how to get it, each agency
is required to publish and keep up to date in the Federal Register
descriptions of its organization, method of functioning and procedures
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for making information available. 10 No machinery is included to police
this requirement, but an agency cannot "adversely affect" a person
by "a matter" which should have been published in the Federal Regis-
ter but was not."
Second, the working sections of the Act direct each agency to make
available final opinions, statements of policy, and staff manuals for
inspection and copying when their'contents affect the public.' 2 Fol-
lowing this specific listing comes a general residuary clause requiring
the agency to make available to any person all other "identifiable
records."' 3 The agency may control by published rules the time, place
and cost to be charged for disclosures, but a refusal to make the record
available is subject to de novo review by a court. The agency bears
the burden of justifying the refusal and an uncooperative official risks
a contempt citation if he defies a court order.' 4
The final section lists categories of information which are exempted
from disclosure. The first exception covers matters that are "specifi-
cally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy."' Under longstanding authority
an executive order has designated the officials who may classify ma-
terial and set the standards which govern what material may be clas-
sified.16 Congress was content to accept the product of this process as
its definition of exempted state secrets. Of the subsequent exemptions,
the most significant address personnel rules and files, internal docu-
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970).
11. "Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms
thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely af-
fected by a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so pub-
lished." Id.
12. Id. § 552(a)(2).
13. Id. § 552(a)(3).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 552(b)(1). This provision was one of the major sources of dissatisfaction with
the Act and has been amended. See pp. 752-59 injra.
16. Congress has authorized the head of an executive or military department to
"prescribe resolutions for ... the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and
property," though with the restriction that "[t]his section does not authorize withholding
information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public." 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1970). The forerunners of this statute go back early in the history of the country
and have been used as authority for withholding documents on security grounds. See Note,
Reform in the Classification and Declassification of National Security Information: Nixon
Executive Order 11,652, 59 IowA L. Rav. 110 (1973). The process of classification of
security material and the designation of the officers who may make the classifications are
governed by Executive Order 11,652, which was issued by President Nixon on March 8,
1972. Exec. Order 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973). It has been esti-
mated that the number of persons who are authorized to issue a Top Secret classification
has been reduced under the Order from 5,100 to 1,860. Note, supra, at 121. The Order
also makes significant progress in opening up material by establishing a mandatory de-
classification system which removes all classifications within ten years, unless a top level
official finds that the material falls within one of four specified areas which allows for a
continuation of the classification and also by setting up a mandatory review procedure
for processing requests for classified information.
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ments which do not reflect agency policy, investigatory files compiled
for law enforcement purposes, 17 business information given by an in-
dividual in confidence, and matters which are specifically exempted
by other statutes.'
Within this structure were several pronounced strengths and weak-
nesses. On the plus side were three quite remarkable features which
have stood the Act in good stead but which Congress might easily
have omitted or qualified into extinction. First, any person may re-
quest information. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 had said
that only "properly and directly concerned" persons could make a re-
quest which had to be honored,' 9 and at least one expert recommended
that a similar test be continued.20 By ignoring the precedent and the
advice, Congress kept standing from being an issue, thereby quashing
one device which would have been used effectively to slam the door
in the faces of many applicants. Second, the Act as a whole established
a presumption in favor of disclosure: Rather than dividing material
between that to be disclosed and that to be kept secret, for example,
the Act contained no bar to disclosure of even exempted material.
The third positive feature is an application of this emphasis on dis-
closure in the remedy sector. The traditional presumption in favor of
contested agency action is reversed; the Act states in unambiguous
terms that the agency has the burden to justify a denial of a request
in an independent court review.
The Act also presented problems, particularly in the exemption
section. The draftsmen were trying to make specific in statutory terms
the many strands of executive privilege which had been viewed in
the past as bases for presidential control over information coming
from the executive department. Although the term "executive privi-
lege" was no stranger to the language of the law, it had never been
precisely defined and its codification inevitably produced ambiguities.
An inquiry into the legislative intent, therefore, was the necessary
starting point for later analysis. This permitted very limiting con-
structions of the Act. Soon after its passage, for example, the Attorney
17. This provision became another source of dissatisfaction and was amended in 1974.
See pp. 759-62 infra.
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)-(7) (1970). The list concludes with two exemptions which are
designed to give protection to specific areas of information. The first exempts matters to
be used by "an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions"; and the second "geological and geophysical information." Id. § 552(b)(8), (9).
19. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 238.
20. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cnt. L. Rav. 761, 765-66
(1967). Professor Davis suggested that it is appropriate to require a balancing of the need
of the party seeking the disclosure against the interest of a party adversely affected by
disclosure. Id. at 806.
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General's office issued a version of the legislative history in which all
doubts were resolved in favor of restricting access to information. 21
This was a sample of the suspicion and hostility that logically were
expected from the executive branch. Throughout the history of the
country, practically all Presidents and many presidential associates
have pledged their dedication to the principles of free and open gov-
ernment. Their brave words are never intended as absolutes. Each
has understood his obligation to withhold information if the national
interest requires, and talk is without great risk when he and his as-
sociates are the people who define the national interest.22 It is easy
to see how self-interest becomes equated with the national interest.
As the practical politician sees it, a discredited administration will
undermine the stability of the government and its capacity to deal
effectively with problems at home and abroad. It follows that every-
thing must be done to protect the administration from being dis-
credited. Presidents Johnson and Nixon spoke forthrightly of their
commitment to the Act. The occasion for Johnson's speech was the
signing of the Act on July 4, 1967, when he associated the objectives
of the new law with the democratic principles celebrated on that day.23
At that time over a half million Americans were fighting in a war
that Congress had never declared and the people little understood.
Nixon made his pledge several days before his reelection in 1972 in
a letter to a committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.
He and his aides were already hard at work hiding every trace of
their involvement in the Watergate break-in.2 4
21. Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, July 4, 1967, reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 264-66 (1968) and in
SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE Comm. ON THE
JUDICIARY, FREEDOm OF INFORIMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES,
ARTICLES, S. Doc. 93-82, 93d CONG., 2d SEss. 196-97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK].
For a comprehensive analysis and criticism of the Memorandum, see Davis, supra note 20.
He predicted correctly that: "The agencies, of course, will follow the Memorandum be-
cause it strains in the direction they want to go. But the courts will provide a better
balance." Id. at 810.
22. Professor Davis cites an instance in which a Department of Justice representative
testified in 1965 that in refusing to disclose information the Executive is only accountable
to the electorate and that Congress cannot give the courts responsibility over executive
records. Davis, supra note 20, at 764, citing Statement by Norbert Schlei, Ass't Att'y Gen.,
Hearings on the Administrative Procedure Act Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 192, 205 (1965).
23. "[A] democracy works best when the people have all the information that the
security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around
decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest." Statement by
President Johnson upon signing Public Law 89-487, July 4, 1967, reprinted in 20 AD. L.
REv. 263-64 (1968) and in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 195.
24. Letter from President Nixon to Robert Fichenberg, Chairman of the Freedom of
Information Comm., Am. Soc'y of Newspaper Editors, Nov. 4, 1972, reprinted in Hearings
on H.R. 5425 & H.R. 4960 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 99-101 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. A
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Nor is there a natural tendency towards revelation at the lower
echelons. The need to cover tracks is obvious in the case of the crook,
liar and malingerer. But no one likes to conduct his or her business
in a fish bowl. The first instinct is one of caution. There is risk to
disclosure with no apparent prospect of offsetting benefit.
Recognizing that the new statute, burdened with exceptions and
ambiguities, would face a hostile world, the early commentators ex-
pressed doubts about its capacity to do the job. Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis, the preeminent scholar in the field of administrative law,
concluded that the statute was badly flawed and practically unwork-
able. He said in pessimistic judgment, "The information the Act opens
up that would otherwise be closed is minimal." 25 And few civil liber-
tarians at the time would have disputed Professor Thomas I. Emerson's
assessment that the right-to-know laws, including the Freedom of In-
formation Act, are "weak and easily evaded." 20
Nor has the Act fared much better in recent years. Most of the
comment in the journals has described the multiplicity of devices the
agencies have invented to avoid disclosure and the instances where the
courts have given the statute a narrow construction and upheld a
denial of access to material.2 7 Ralph Nader summed it up in describ-
ing the experiences a task force under his direction had in obtaining
information from a select group of agencies. 28 Although conceding
that many officials were cooperating, his overall conclusion was nega-
tive: "Government officials at all levels . . . have systematically and
routinely violated both the purpose and specific provisions of the
law." 20
There are explanations for this poor press. At first there were gen-
uine doubts as to what the courts might do to the statute and a cau-
tionary tone was appropriate. Most of the writers since have, like
Nader, been partisans on the side of open access to government in-
formation and may have been motivated, in accentuating the negative,
by the need to build a record which would convince Congress of the
transcript of the taped conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, which took place on
June 23, 1972, proved the President's knowledge of the Watergate break-in and his gen-
eral approval of the attempts to keep knowledge of it from the public. N.Y. Times, Aug.
6, 1974, at 14, col. 2. The attempts to suppress continued from that time on. On September
15, 1972, for instance, the President directed John Dean: "So you just try to button it
up as well as you can .... " N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1974, at 13, col. 1.
25. Davis, supra note 20, at 803.
26. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 672 (1970).
27. See, e.g., Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 48 T.xAs L. REV. 1261 (1970).
28. Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv. Civ.
RIGHTS-Civ. Lim. L. REv. 1 (1970).
29. Id. at 2.
747
The Yale Law Journal
necessity of strengthening the Act through amendments. But the litera-
ture, from today's vantage point, does seem to have unreasonably high
expectations. To satisfy such critics the Act would have needed divine
powers to reverse human nature and compel the silent to speak.
Instant maturity was of course beyond the capabilities of the fledg-
ling statute. Now the Act has had almost seven years in operation and
has emerged from its trial period intact. The record of the first stage
of development gives no cause for gloom. A few details emerged which
required congressional attention. For the most part, however, the
record is one of solid achievement.
B. The Act in Practice: Three Successes
1. Reception by the Courts. Approximately 200 cases have been
brought to obtain review of agency denials of requests for informa-
tion.30 It is impossible to compile a box score of results. Some cases
are unreported, the results of others are inconclusive, and many have
been withdrawn because a favorable compromise has been reached.
Observers of the system agree that the seekers of information have
done well before the courts and have usually gotten most of the ma-
terial they were after.31 Except for two lines of cases involving two
of the exemptions-authority which has since been overruled by the
Amendments32-the cases have reflected the policy that "exemptions
from disclosure must be construed narrowly in such a way as to pro-
vide maximum access consonant with the overall purpose of the Act." 33
Judicial encouragement and favorable precedents on many disputed
points have contributed to the Act's forward momentum.
2. Institutional Developments. The Act only goes to work if some-
one makes a request for information, but an individual citizen is not
apt to know how, nor have the resources, to take advantage of its pro-
visions. He is likely to need an attorney-which means, particularly if
the information involves more than routine matters and litigation is
a possibility, being prepared to spend $1,000 or more in fees and costs
30. A useful index and synopsis of all the reported cases until mid-1974 is set out in
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 115-90; an excellent review of the important cases appears
in Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
895 (1974).
31. During the Senate debates, Senator Edward Kennedy quoted Attorney General
Elliot Richardson: "The courts have resolved almost all legal doubts in favor of dis-
closure." 120 CONG. REc. S9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974). For the full text of Richardson's
remarks, see Hearings on S. 1142 Before Subcomms. on Admin. Practice and Procedure and
Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 122-26
(1973); House Hearings, supra note 24, at 333-34.
32. See pp. 752-62 infra.
33. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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alone.34 Under such circumstances it might have happened that only
wealthy business people who saw an opportunity to obtain, from the
regulatory agencies, competitors' trade secrets or operators who planned
to exploit sensational material now secured in government files would
take the necessary initiatives under the Act. That the history of the
first seven years has not been so sterile is a credit to the private, non-
profit public service and good government groups who have been
quick to realize how the Act could be put to work to get information
and to increase public awareness of important national issues. Or-
ganizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, Aviation Con-
sumer Action Project, Center For National Policy Review, Consumers
Union, Corporate Accountability Research Group, and Washington
Research Project have been responsible, either through their own of-
ficers or by helping others, in opening up locked government files.
A particularly significant event occurred in 1972 with the opening of
the Freedom of Information Clearinghouse as a section of Nader's
Center for the Study of Responsive Law.35 The Clearinghouse has
as its mission the use of the Information Act and the 1973 Federal
Advisory Committee Act, which opens up to the public advisory com-
mittee deliberations, to advance public causes generally.36 It offers a
variety of services to individuals and groups: advising them on how
to make requests for information, litigating refusals to access when
a party needs help and the cause is appropriate, informing citizens of
their rights under state government access laws, and encouraging peo-
ple generally to take advantage of their right to be informed. With
this kind of institutional help, each citizen has it in his or her power
to make the government pay heed to a request for information.
Institutional adjustments have also occurred within the government
agencies. Though much of the testimony heard at the congressional
hearings in 1973 described the ingenuity of agency officials in avoid-
ing compliance with the Act, many officials, either out of conviction
that the Act was right or out of resignation that it was here to stay,
began to create machinery within their agencies to process requests
for information.37 It is now quite common for an agency to require
34. Testimony of Ronald Plesser of the Center for the Study of Responsive Law,
House Hearings, supra note 24, at 346.
35. A Docket of Dec. 31, 1974, describes the activities of the Freedom of Information
Clearinghouse including its active participation in 30 cases which are briefly summarized.
(The Docket may be obtained on request, P.O. lox 19367, Washington, D.C. 20036.)
36. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 1 (Supp. II, 1973).
37. The Administrative Conference of the United States, a permanent, independent
federal agency, issued a recommendation in May 1971, urging the agencies to give the
fullest possible cooperation to the objectives of the Act. Hearings on Administration and
Operation of the Freedom of Information Act Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 1227 (1972).
749
The Yale Law Journal
that a denial of a request be reviewed by a departmental lawyer and
top authorities before being released. The regulations of the Justice
Department serve as a prototype.38 They state that when the public
interest dictates, records will not be withheld even though exempted,
that assistance in identifying records must be given persons in making
out requests, that action on requests must be taken within ten days,
that denials must be explained and documented, that an administra-
tive appeal to the Attorney General must be available within 30 days
after a denial and that classified records must not be withheld after
ten years unless a review committee directs otherwise. The Justice
Department has also offered a variety of services to other agencies, in-
cluding training for both lawyers and nonlawyers in the Act's obliga-
tions and advice to agencies facing requests for information, although
it appears that to date few have taken advantage of this service.39
3. Secrets Revealed. At first the information brought to light by
the operation of the Act involved corporate matters, the disclosure
of which did little to achieve the goal of broad public education on
affairs of national concern. Meanwhile, requests for details from the
Warren Commission report or the files of the Department of the
Army concerning the My Lai massacre were stalled in court. It ap-
peared that the more sensational the material the less prepared the
courts were to order disclosure. One author sadly concluded: "The
FOIA does little to unlock the quality knowledge of common public,
as opposed to private corporate, interest."40
Three highly publicized disclosures in November 1974 proved that
judgment to be premature, for in each case the government, prodded
by suits under the Act, revealed material it viewed as both sensitive
and embarrassing. During that month the Atomic Energy Commission
finished releasing documents, which it had suppressed over a ten-year
period, setting out opinions of staff scientists that a major reactor
38. Production or Disclosure Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-16.10 (1974).
39. See generally Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y.C., Amendments to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, Apr. 22, 1974, at 4. On December 8, 1969, the Justice Department sent a
memorandum to the general counsels of all departments and agencies requesting them to
consult the Department before finally denying a request for information if by that denial
litigation might take place which would adversely affect the government. To carry out
the consultation, a Freedom of Information Act Committee was created consisting of two
lawyers from the Civil Division and three from the office of Legal Counsel. Saloschin,
The Work of the Freedom of Information Committee of the Department of Justice, 23
AD. L. REv. 147 (1971). Apparently, an invitation to use the Committee's services was not
enough. On June 26, 1973, Attorney General Richardson, testifying in a hearing by three
Senate subcimmittees on various aspects of government secrecy added: "I will order our
litigating divisions not to defend freedom-of-information lawsuits against the agencies
unless the committee has been consulted." Saloschin, Administering the Freedom of In-
formation Act: An Insider's View, in NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN
AMERICA 189-90 (N. Dorsen & S. Gillers eds. 1974).
40. Note, supra note 30, at 959.
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accident might kill up to 45,000 people and create a disaster area
the size of Pennsylvania. 41 On November 14 the Department of the
Army gave up on holding back the Peers report describing the details
of the My Lai massacre and of the failure of high-ranking officers
to face up to their responsibilities. 42 On November 17 the Internal
Revenue Service surrendered to the Tax Reform Research Group
memoranda, letters and other documents describing the activities of
an investigative group of the IRS which had since 1969 been keeping
"leftist organizations" under surveillance.43
II. The 1974 Amendments
On May 2, 1973, Representative William S. Moorhead, Chairman
of the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
committee, banged his gavel and opened hearings on amending the
Act.4 4 Testimony charged that agencies had avoided compliance by
delay and by assessing excessive charges for services rendered in dig-
ging out and reproducing the materials, 45 and that the executive
departments had failed to create a positive attitude in support of open
access.4 1 Disappointment was expressed that the press had not found
the Act more useful, but newsmen claimed that the process was too
slow and expensive to meet their needs and deadlines.4 The several
representatives from the agencies blamed most of the problems on the
difficulties they had had in adjusting to the substantial administrative
burdens which the Act had suddenly thrust upon them; they asked for
more time to perfect the procedures to comply with the existing re-
quirements. New provisions, they claimed, would impose an additional
burden which would be almost impossible to handle.48
41. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 1, col. 1. As the account indicates, the material be-
came public over a period of time; somc segments of it came out in leaks and the balance
was released because of suits or threats of suits.
42. Id., Nov. 14, 1974, at 16, col. 4 (city ed.).
43. Id., Nov. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.). The precedent for disclosure of information
concerning domestic surveillance was established in Stern v. Richardson where the district
court ordered the FBI to release documents relating to its counter-intelligence program
entitled "Cointel-pro-New Left." 367 F. Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973).
44. House Hearings, supra note 24.
45. Id. at 91.
46. See, e.g., id. at 93, 346. The indictment was not new; Ralph Nader had put it in
blunter terms a few years before, alleging that the agencies gave favored treatment to
their friends while turning ordinary citizens away at the door, that wide variations existed
in the interpretation of the exemptions and in the agency procedures that had to be
exhausted before going to court, and that an array of devices had been developed to
render material unavailable ranging from falsely claiming it to be covered by an exemp-
tion to denying its existence. See Nader, supra note 28.
47. House Hearings, supra note 24, at 46, 48.
48. Statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of
the Dep't of Justice, House Hearings, supra note 24, at 102-45.
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Many changes in the wording of the Act were proposed, but in the
end only a few appeared in the final drafts which were presented in
the House and Senate.4 " As the Senate Judiciary Committee explained,
new language might increase rather than lessen confusion and this
risk should not be run as long as the courts were interpreting the ex-
emptions to favor public disclosure.50 Thus the basic Act was retained
without substantive change. The Amendments were designed to cor-
rect unforeseen problems which had developed because the original
wording had not fully achieved its intended goals. The Amendments
are of three types: (1) substantive material designed to correct inter-
pretations given by the courts to two of the exemptions which restrict
disclosure, (2) a series of procedural directives which combine prin-
ciples of sanction and reward to obtain a larger outflow of informa-
tion, and (3) the further definition and expansion of several of the
provisions which set out the reach and responsibilities of the Act.
A. Correction of Judicial Error
Everyone agreed that the courts had done well by the Act. Most
sections had been construed to carry out the functions the proponents
of full disclosure had in mind for them. There was dissatisfaction,
however, with the judicial interpretation of two of the exemptions:
those dealing with state secrets and with the privilege for investigative
files. Much of the debate focused on these issues, 51 and even included
dire predictions of the imminent collapse of American democracy. 2
But there is nothing in the text of either of the two amendments which
eventually emerged to suggest they are of blockbuster quality. In truth,
Congress simply restored the boundaries originally intended for each
exemption. 53
1. "National Defense or Foreign Policy." The first exemption in the
original Act had saved from disclosure matter "specifically required by
the Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national de-
fense or foreign policy."54 Does this mean that the executive has ex-
clusive control over this large and amorphous area of material and
that the courts cannot review the executive action? In Environmental
49. See S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. S9310-12 (daily ed. May 30, 1974);
H. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. H1801-02 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1974).
50. 120 CONG. REC. S9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
51. For the House debates, see 120 CoNr. REc. H1788-1803 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1974);
for the Senate debates, see 120 CONG. REC. S9310-33 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
52. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. S9335 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska);
id. at S9321 (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
53. See id. at S9322 (remarks of Sen. Javits), S9336 (remarks of Sen. P. Hart).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
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Protection Agency v. Mink Justice White, speaking for a majority of
the Court, seemed to give an affirmative answer 55
Everyone conceded that the documents in Mink had been classified,
that the classification had occurred before the request was made and
that the classification had been supervised by an authorized official.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had found that nonclassi-
fied material was mixed in with the classified material and ordered
the district court to conduct an in camera review to separate and re-
lease the nonsecret portions of the documents.5 6 Justice White, how-
ever, wrote that once a document has been classified by an authorized
official under the governing executive order, it is put outside the
reach of the Act and cannot be ordered disclosed. Court review of
such executive decisions-even in camera-is foreclosed.
Subsequent decisions pecked away at the seemingly absolute bar of
Mink, ordering documents to be reviewed to test whether they had
in fact been classified, and, if so, whether the procedure of the execu-
tive order had been followed.5 7 The Amendments, however, completely
overrule the Mink holding. The new language now excepts from
disclosure matters which are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classi-
fied pursuant to such Executive order."58 In the g-rant of authority
to a district court to review a denial, the court "may examine the con-
tents of such agency records in camera" to see whether they are cov-
ered by "any of the exemptions." 59 In addition, any "reasonably seg-
regable portion" of a classified record must be released.00
In the course of the debates occasioned by the passage, presidential
55. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
56. Mink v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
57. Weisberg v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., Civil No. 2052-73 (D.D.C. 1974), for
example, held that the government had the burden of showing "procedural regularity"
in that "the classification" was ordered by an individual authorized to do so under duly
prescribed procedures. The court (though it held the material sought was exempt as an
investigatory file) ruled that it was not enough that the government Archivist stated under
oath that a transcript of an executive session of the Warren Commission had been classified
"Top Secret." Similarly, in Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1974), petitioner
requested to see reports in the files of the State Department describing conditions in
prisoner of war camps in Viet Nam. When refused because the reports were classified,
he brought discovery proceedings to find out whether all copies of the reports had been
stamped "Confidential," whether the classification had been made in accordance with
proper procedures, and whether the classification came after the request for disclosure
in order to thwart that request. The Appeals Court held that Mink did not require this
initiative to be stopped by summary judgment, that it was open to the courts to decide
whether the material is classified.
58. Amendments, supra note 8, § 2(a).
59. Id. § 1(b)C2)(4)(B ) .60. Id. § 2(c).
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veto, and re-passage of the amendments, this provision aroused the
most concern. Discussion centered around charges that the Amend-
ment was unconstitutional, that federal courts lacked the capacity to
handle such a job, and that the provision might threaten national
security. The exemption as passed seems to resolve each of these
satisfactorily.
The Constitutional Challenge. President Ford made the changes in
the national security exemption a major target of his veto message.
He hypothesized a proceeding in which a district judge is examining
a classification made by the Secretary of Defense on national security
grounds. If the judge finds it equally reasonable to disclose as to sup-
press, he must, the President argued, find for the petitioner and against
the Secretary because the burden of proof is on the government. "Such
a provision would violate constitutional principles." 61 His suggested
remedy was to shift the burden so that the governmental classification
would stand if there were a reasonable basis to support it.62
There is nothing on the face of the statute to support a claim of
constitutional invalidity. In truth, the amendments don't purport to
do very much. They do not remove or even limit the traditional pro-
tection for state secrets. All the new wording does is to require the
executive department to comply with its own rules as set out by ex-
ecutive order and to give the court the authority to decide whether
there has been such compliance. The Supreme Court, in United States
v. Reynolds, approved a similar procedure. 63 There the widows of
three civilian observers who were killed in a bomber crash sued the
United States under the Tort Claims Act. In the preparation of their
case they moved for production of the Air Force's accident report
and the statements of three surviving crew members. The Air Force
claimed that the matter was a privileged military secret which could
not be released under departmental regulations. The Court held that
the judge should stop short of ordering a personal viewing if con-
vinced by other evidence that the information did involve national
security. The Court did imply, however, that if necessary the judge
could examine all the circumstances to satisfy himself that the claim
of privilege was appropriate, even including an examination in cham-
bers of the secret material. The amended exemption works in much
the same way. There is nothing in Mink to suggest that the Constitu-
61. Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments, Oct. 17, 1974, 10 WEEKLY
COMP. PR.s. Docs. 1318 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Veto Message].
62. Id.
63. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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tion disallows this procedure. Justice White conceded that Congress
could make its own rules to control the classification process, and
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, seemed to be exhorting Con-
gress to pass just the kind of legislation that it did. 4
Presumably, the government, if it is of a mind to challenge the
procedure on constitutional grounds, will await a case involving a
request for highly sensitive information. If, for instance, the Defense
or State Department were asked to disclose their codes they might
well respond that the material is so critically important that they
cannot discuss it, let alone reveal enough of it to the court to make
out the case for its exemption. Constitutional issues might be raised
in such a context. An order requiring the delivery to the court of
any of the material to facilitate review could be challenged as an
unconstitutional interference with the President's authority to con-
duct foreign and military affairs and as such a violation of the separa-
tion of powers. 5 Fortunately, such a case is not likely to develop to
a point where the constitutional issues regarding the review procedure
under this exemption will have to be decided. Under the Amendments,
the judge is authorized, but not required, to examine the secret ma-
terial to see whether it qualifies for the exemption. Under circum-
stances like those presented by a request for government codes, it is
to be expected that exemption from disclosure would be established
on proof that in no way compromised the integrity of the code.
Federal Court Capacity. The capacity of the federal courts to cope
with the responsibilities given them by the Amendments was ques-
tioned by opponents of the legislation on several grounds. First, there
was the practical problem of whether the courts would be so swamped
with material that a real examination of it would be impossible.06 Sec-
64. 410 U.S. at 83, 94-95.
65. See generally Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitu-
tional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to
Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271 (1971).
66. In Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia criticized agencies who responded to requests for information by
submitting masses of material to the court, claiming it all to be exempt under several of
the exceptions to the Act. The Court called it a "tactical ploy" designed to compel the
district court, overwhelmed by a "morass of material" which it must test against several
"imprecise exemptions," id. at 826, to accept the government's argument because it has
no practical alternative. (Unfortunately courts cannot look to petitioner's counsel for
help in this area; counsel does not have sufficient knowledge of the contents of the
material the government has withheld, nor the means to discover it, to contest the claims
of immunity under the exemptions.)
The Court was flat-out in its condemnation: "[C]ourts will simply no longer accept
conclusionary and generalized allegations of exemptions ... but will require a relatively
detailed analysis in manageable segments." Id. Henceforth an agency when withholding
from public scrutiny a large amount of material or a long document must, at risk of
having the whole mass ordered disclosed, separate out the pages which are claimed to be
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ond, fears were expressed that a district court would never have the
overall picture within which classification decisions must be made. Pro-
security spokesmen alleged that, in contrast to a top official who makes
a security judgment which is based on the national interest as he sees it
against a global background of which only he or she is fully aware,
a judge is an amateur passing judgment on professionals. 7 He faces
an infinite variety of unknowns which he can only understand if he
leaves the bench and joins the department. 8 Implicit in much of the
debate, although no one wanted to be heard knocking the integrity
of the federal bench, may have been a conviction that the process
put the national security in jeopardy, that a secret which is widely
shared soon becomes general knowledge.
During the hearings there was talk of establishing a nonpartisan,
seven-member Freedom of Information Commission which would in-
vestigate denials of disclosure at the request of a federal court, Con-
gress or one of its committees, the Comptroller General, one of the
agencies, or, with the concurrence of three members of the Commis-
sion, a private citizen. 9 The aim was to turn over the burdens to a
panel of experts who, backed up by a staff of professionals, would
bring organization to large lots of documents and would develop a
capacity to bring uncooperative agencies in line. Yet many witnesses
-ranging from those representing agencies to those from press and
public service groups-were unenthusiastic about the idea of inter-
posing another layer of bureaucracy before obtaining court review.
70
The proposal for a commission was shelved.
exempt and describe and index them in such a way that the court and opposing counsel
have some idea of the nature of the material being withheld, its location in the overall
mass and the specific exemptions which are said to save it from disclosure.
On remand John J. Lafferty, Deputy Director, Bureau of Personnel Management Evalu-
ation of the Civil Service Commission, filed an affidavit stating that it would require
10,257.1 person-hours or 4.93 person-years, at a total cost of $96,176, to index all the
documents in accordance with the court of appeals order. The parties agreed that the
government should proceed by submitting nine representative samples with identifying
details excised to be examined by the court to see whether the material was exempt under
the Act. The judge released much of the material but ordered certain documents with-
held under the sixth exemption which protects personnel and medical files, the dis-
closure of which constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Vaughn v.
Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049 (D.D.C. 1974).
67. 120 CONG. REc. S9322-23 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). President
Ford also made the point in his letter to the chairman of the conference committee con-
sidering the Amendments. Letter to Conference Chairman, Aug. 26, 1974, 10 VEEKLY
COMi. PRES. Docs. 1062 (1974).
68. Cf. Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.) ("As has been stated, the
judiciary has neither 'the aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility' to review these essentially
political decisions"), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc.
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Developments in the Law-The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1130, 1225-26 (1972).
69. For a draft of this proposal, see House Hearings, supra note 24, at 12-20.
70. Id. at 141-42 (spokesman from an agency), 338 (spokesman from the public sector).
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In the end, the federal courts were left to make the review of se-
curity classifications. They supervised exemption claims generally, and
there was no real alternative. If a court needs help, the judge has
it in his discretion to appoint a special master to assist-processing
voluminous material. 71
One trace of the idea of a specialized tribunal to review agency de-
nials remains. The original Act directs that matters be brought to the
court in the district where the complainant resides or has his business
or where the agency records are located.72 The new legislation grants
concurrent venue to the district cQurts in the District of Columbia.73
A complainant is not compelled to abandon his home court but may
at his option take advantage of the experience that the courts in the
District have in this area. The invitation has its attractions. The Capi-
tol has a bar familiar with the Act, courts which have favored dis-
closure, and an overall atmosphere in which state secrets are less apt
to be treated as holy writ.
The Problem of National Security. The Senate draft had said that
if an agency head submitted an affidavit "certifying that he had per-
sonally examined the documents withheld and has determined after
such examination that they should be withheld . . ."-in other words,
a statement that this document is hot stuff and the agency is really
serious about its classification-"the court shall sustain such withhold-
ing unless, following its in camera examination, it finds the with-
holding is without a reasonable basis . . . . "4 In short, this provision
would have shifted the burden of proof from the government to
the petitioner in cases involving national security. It is possible that
Senator Kennedy, who authored the draft and who was steering it
through the Senate, went along with this language to keep peace
within a coalition which included a number of conservatives whose
support was necessary to avoid a showdown over the provisions which
imposed sanctions against officials who unreasonably withheld in-
formation.
Senator Muskie, who as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-
governmental Relations has had a long standing interest in the Infor-
mation Act, had no such tactical encumbrances. He and a number of
colleagues saw the provision as inconsistent with the spirit of the
Act. They moved to delete it in its entirety.7 5 The debate was not
71. F.D. R. Civ. P. 53.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
73. Amendments, supra note 8, at § 1(b)(4)(B).
74. S. 2543, supra note 49, § 1(b)(4)(B)(ii).
75. Id. at S9318-20.
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lacking in passion. The security-minded argued that with the "gates
wide open" the country was in dire peril because the courts lacked
the experience to make "political judgments in the field of foreign
affairs and national defense." 76 The tide was, however, running the
other way. Senator Ervin had the last word: "If a judge does riot have
enough sense to make that kind of a judgment and determine the
matter, he ought not to be a judge .... "77 The offending language
was removed from the bill.7s
The debate on the national security exemption thus ended in a
victory for the advocates of open government. Mink was set aside and
the federal courts are now authorized to review security classifications,
with the burden remaining on the government to justify non-disclosure.
Agency heads may, of course, introduce affidavits of personal concern
to bolster their claims that security information should not be dis-
closed. It remains to be seen what weight the courts will give such
declarations. On the one hand, the legislative history contains a spe-
cific rejection by the Senate of a proposal to codify a presumption in
favor of governmental classification. However, in the conference report
resolving the differences between the House and Senate drafts, the con-
ferees went out of their way to discount implications from that fact.
Because the executive departments had "unique insights" into the
effects of disclosure of classified material, the conferees "expected" that
federal courts would "accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit
concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record."79
It appears that a court will have a choice of which version of the
legislative history it wishes to adopt.
The issue of national security generated the most heat and attracted
the most attention, both in and out of Congress. It is,, however, ques-
tionable whether the new law will significantly increase the number
of successful applications for information about these matters. It is
not written to be a remedy for over-classification. It will keep agen-
cies from classifying material after a request for disclosure of that ma-
terial has been made, from claiming the exemption for material be-
cause it is classifiable although it has not in fact been classified, and
from withholding the whole because some of the parts are classified.
Yet the criteria for classification will be established by the executive
department. The new law does no more than to require the executive
department to hold faithful to its own prescriptions. If over-classifi-
76. Id. at S9321 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); S9322-23 (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
77. Id. at S9326.
78. The vote was 56 yeas, 29 nays and 15 not voting. Id. at S9328.
79. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
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cation is the problem, then Congress and the President must face it
directly and develop new rules to govern the system of classification. 0
But the legislation and the history of its enactment does have impor-
tant symbolic significance. Fundamental to the Act is the location of
the burden on the government. A determined effort was made to shift
the burden to the petitioner. In beating it back, Congress preserved
internal consistency and made clear its intention that the Act stand
for disclosure first, permitting nondisclosure only when affirmative
justification has been demonstrated.
2. Investigatory Files. The drafts of the Amendments left all the
other exemptions unchanged when they came to the House and Senate
floors for debate.8' But even as congressional attention focused on ways
of making more information available, a series of decisions was coming
down which greatly expanded the scope of the exemption protecting
investigatory files.
As. originally written, exemption seven kept from disclosure "in-
vestigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency."82 The in-
terpretation of the exemption depended on the scope given to the
term "law enforcement proceedings. ' 8 3 In the first big test of this
provision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stuck
close to the literal meaning and the exemption seemed safely confined
to a narrow track.8 4 In 1967 the Bristol-Myers Company had requested
certain documents amassed by the Federal Trade Commission in the
course of an investigation of Bristol-Myers -and other companies for
false advertising. At the time of the request, the complaint against the
company had been withdrawn for two years and no new action ap-
peared to be contemplated. The district court sustained a denial of
the request8s The appeals court, however, saw the exemption as de-
signed to prevent a litigant from learning more about the case against
him than he would under the regular rules of discovery.80 So, the
80. Reform will not be easy to come by. See Henkin, supra note 65, at 278-80.
81. For the Senate draft, see 120 CONG. REC. S9310-12 (daily ed. May 30, 1974); for the
House draft, see 120 CONG. REC. H1801-02 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1974).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
83. No clear understanding has emerged explaining the meaning of the trailing clause.
Presumably, the exemption was not to cover material which a party in litigation with the
agency could get by discovery. One commentator described it as a "quizzical constraint"
which was often ignored by the courts. Note, supra note 30, at 948. It is gone from the
revised law and its meaning need bother us no more.
84. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1972).
85. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968).
86. 424 F.2d at 939.
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court reasoned, if no further proceedings were imminent, the gov-
ernment's case would not be compromised by disclosure and the ex-
emption was not available. The lower court was reversed and the
agency admonished that it could not "protect all its files with the
label 'investigatory' and a suggestion that enforcement proceedings
may be launched at some unspecified future date."87 A different ap-
proach emerged in the Second Circuit. In Frankel v. SEC"" that court
interpreted the exemption to include protection of investigatory tech-
niques and the identity of informants. The court reasoned that Con-
gress had wanted to protect the whole investigatory process and not
just an agency's position in a single proceeding;8 9 the exemption was
seen as general in content and indefinite in duration.
Because the bulk of the requests for information are reviewed in
the courts of the District of Columbia, however, the principles which
control there are of particular significance. If the court of appeals
had held to its narrow construction of the exemption as set out in
Bristol-Myers, it might have been argued that Frankel was an isolated
aberration. But the advocates of open disclosure were in for bad luck
in the District of Columbia. The next case, Weisberg v. Department
of Justice,90 involved a request for spectrographic analysis of a bullet
which was used in the assassination of President Kennedy. The court,
reflecting the prevailing sentiment in the country that this file is best
kept locked, treated the request with a measure of distaste. The case
for disclosure under Bristol-Myers was strong (the information was in
the investigatory files of the Warren Commission, but enforcement
proceedings were not possible because Lee Harvey Oswald was dead
and the assassination of a president was not a federal crime). The court,
however, refused to limit the exemption to situations where proceed-
ings were imminent. Though the court gave lip service to the idea
that the Attorney General's "ipse dixit does not finalize the matter,"91
its reasoning was similar to that applied to the first exemption by
the Supreme Court in Mink. It held that "[w]here the district court
can conclude that the Attorney General's designation and classification
are correct the Freedom of Information Act requires no more."0 ,2 It
found such a conclusion "overwhelmingly" demonstrated by the record,
and so refused a remand for an examination of whether the files would
87. Id.
88. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). Accord, Evans v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
89. 460 F.2d at 817-18.
90. 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
91. Id. at 1202.
92. Id.
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be used for law enforcement purposes or whether their disclosure
would be in any way damaging to law enforcement mechanisms. The
dissent, on the other hand, argued that the thrust of the Act was to
keep an executive official from deciding by unilateral act what was
or was not to be disclosed. Under the circumstances in the case, the
dissent stated, the trial judge should be required to examine the ma-
terial in chambers with the burden on the agency to demonstrate
that disclosure was likely to lead to specific harm.93
The paradoxical combination of verbal acknowledgment and prac-
tical curtailment of the district court's power of review in Weisberg
established the pattern for several other cases which came before the
D.C. court in 1974. Representative Aspin's request to see the Army's
preliminary investigation of the My Lai incident was denied;94 though
the courts-martial against 15 soldiers were completed, the court held
that the disclosure of even inactive files might impair future investi-
gations. It stated that the district court need not hold a hearing into
the ways such investigations might be prejudiced. Rather, it was suf-
ficient to base the order on affidavits from three Defense Department
officials that the investigation "figured prominently in the initiation
of subsequent court-martial proceedings." In like manner the Court
held in Ditlow v. Brinegar that the agency need not prove how dis-
closure would harm its law enforcement efficiency.95 It is enough to
justify the exemption, it held, if the district judge finds that the ma-
terial is in a file compiled for law enforcement purposes which might
conceivably lead to a civil proceeding at some future date. Finally,
in Center for National Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v.
WeinbergerOO the court held that files involving agency review of dis-
criminatory practices in northern areas were "investigatory files" and
thus exempt. Though the court stated that the "investigatory" label
was not conclusive, it refused to remand for further examination by
the district court because appellees conceded the investigatory nature
of the files, and argued merely that enforcement proceedings were
not imminent.
By late May 1974, when the Senate was debating the Amendments,
it was apparent that the seventh exemption had suffered the same fate
as the first.0 7 In practice, files labeled as investigatory became ex-
93. Id. at 1203-07 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
94. As pin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
95. 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
97. For a full analysis, see Note, The Investigatory Files Exemption of the FOIA: The
D.C. Circuit Abandons Bristol-Myers, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 869 (1974).
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empt, and it had become practically impossible to challenge the clas-
sification as unjustified under the purposes of the exemption. Because
the hour was late, corrective action had to be taken from the floor.
Senator Philip Hart and 15 of his colleagues moved to amend by
eliminating the catchall phrase "compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses" and spelling out in specific terms the areas the exemption was
to protect.98 Under the new wording the exemption applies when the
production of records will interfere with enforcement proceedings,
deprive a person of a fair trial, constitute an invasion of privacy,
reveal a confidential source, disclose investigative techniques, or en-
danger the safety of law enforcement personnel. 99 Because this listing
goes beyond the cases in setting out legitimate justifications for ap-
plying the exemption, its proponents were obviously not trying to
restrict the exemption by substantive changes. Senator Hart conceded
as much when he admitted that taken literally the new formula was
broader than the original provision. 00
If there is an apparent paradox here, it is only on the surface.
Neither the pro-disclosure people nor the security-minded were con-
fused as to where their self-interest was located. At the close of the
debate, Senator Kennedy asked Senator Hart if it was the intent of
his amendment to override the Weisberg, Aspin, Ditlow and National
Center cases.' 0 ' Senator Hart answered that it was. On that note the
Amendment carried, and the FBI had suffered a seldom duplicated
congressional setback. 102 I
Unfortunately, there may be uncertainty as to the meaning of the
interchange between the two senators. The exemption was upheld in
the cited cases because disclosure might reveal investigatory techniques
or material which might be used in some future legal action. Because
the Amendment continues to accept these as valid grounds for ex-
emption, it cannot be said that the Amendment overrules the sub-
stantive principle used in those cases. Rather, the aim of the new
law was to make the procedures described in the Weisberg dissent
mandatory, 03 to prevent an agency from claiming an exemption just
98. 120 CONG. REC. S9329-30 (daily ed. May 30, 1974). A draft of the amendment was
originally prepared by the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association.
See id. at S9331. The Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York gave its support. See Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y.C., supra note 39, at
31-37.
99. Amendments, supra note 8, § 2(a)(7).
100. "One could argue that the amendment we are now considering, if adopted, would
leave the Freedom of Information Act less available to a concerned citizen that [sic] was
the case with the 1966 language initially." 120 CoNe. Rae. S9336 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
101. Id.
102. The vote was 51 yeas, 33 nays and 16 not voting. Id. at S9337.
103. %Veisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1203-07 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
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by showing that information is in an investigatory file. Instead, an
agency must now convince the judge that the disclosure of a document
will cause the government harm in one of the areas set out in the
statute.104
When the smoke had cleared, the substance of exemption seven,
like that of exemption one, had not been fundamentally changed.
Senator Kennedy was able in his summation to boast of the sensitivity
to security displayed by the more detailed provisions of the amended
section.10 A procedural revolution had occurred however. In the fu-
ture, agencies will be required to invest vastly more time and money
in searching their files, and even slight delay may lead to mandatory
disclosure.'00
B. Toward Automatic Disclosure
Much of the testimony at the hearings expressed disappointment
that the agencies had not been more cooperative. The top administra-
tors, witnesses alleged, had failed to push full implementation of the
Act, while middle-level officials had no incentive to abandon past
habits of caution. The safe course continued to be "when in doubt,
deny."107
The Amendments were designed to change these conditions and to
create an atmosphere in which officials disclose first and suppress only
if they are personally prepared to defend their action. There being
no magic wand to change humans into angels, the conversion can
only be achieved by a combination of the whip and the carrot. The
new Amendments contain substantial dosages of both.
Although congressional debate centered on the exemptions, it is
104. Future petitioners can be expected to request a page-by-page showing that the
material is within one of the subsections of the exemption and that disclosure will cause
real harm to the government's law enforcement processes. The Amendments leave open,
however, the question of the extent of harm necessary to investigatory techniques or of
interference with enforcement proceedings necessary to claim exemption. Amendments,
supra note 8, § 2(a)(7). The Joint Explanatory Statement of the committee of conference,
H.R. REL'. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report],
stated as to investigative techniques that they "should not be interpreted to include
routine techniques and procedures already well-known to the public, such as ballistics
tests, fingerprinting and other scientific tests or commonly known techniques." Id. at 12.
The record contains no explicit discussion of the question of imminence of law enforce-
ment proceedings.
105. "[T]he amendment itself has considerable sensitivity built in to protect against
the invasion of privacy, and to protect the identities of informants, and most generally to
protect the legitimate interests of a law enforcement agency to conduct an investigation
into any one of these crimes which have been outlined in such wonderful verbiage here
this afternoon-treason, espionage, or what have you." 120 CONG. REc. S9336 (daily ed.
May 30, 1974).
106. See p. 764 infra.
107. The "major problem areas" are summarized in S. REP'. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
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likely that the provisions which will most significantly contribute to
the opening of files are those to speed processes, increase agency and
individual responsibility, and lower costs. Activity under the Act was
already brisk. With the new law encouraging petitioners and punishing
offenders, the volume will increase dramatically.
What we cannot predict now is whether the new vitality will come
at a prohibitive price. There were dire predictions that the Amend-
ments are administratively impossible. 08 Others disagreed.10 Congress
made no studies to test the reality of these concerns. The data would
be unreliable in any event because the volume of future requests is
unpredictable. Because Congress also failed to appropriate any money
to meet the new expenses authorized in the law or to hire additional
personnel to help with the increase in business, any problems that
result will have to be remedied at a future date.
1. Speeding up the Process. Practically all the complaints about
agency performance under the Act stressed delay. One study found
that on the average 33 days elapsed before a request was answered and
50 days were required to get a response to an administrative appeal.' 10
The press, in particular, found the delays prejudicial. By the time in-
formation they sought was in hand, their stories often had lost all
news value.
The Amendments set out a tight administrative timetable."' An
agency must reply to a request within 10 working days after its re-
ceipt either by releasing the information or by denying the request
giving reasons and notice of the appeal procedure. A final determina-
tion on any appeal must be made within 20 days after the appeal
has been filed. Allowance is made for one 10-day extension to be taken
108. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, for example, received during 1972
an average of 7,500 requests each month for records kept in 6,297,000 active files located
in 57 field offices scattered throughout the country or in 5,938,000 inactive files stored in
10 Federal Records Centers. The typical request asks for the file of a single individual,
and, because people have frequently moved from their original residences, the discovery
of the office where the file is located may be a major undertaking without more. State-
ment of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice,
House Hearings, supra note 24, at 115. In a dramatic summation, one witness envisioned
future instances when buildings are bombed, nuclear plants go awry, airliners crash, the
mail service is stalled and a shipment of heroin is not stopped because at a key time
personnel of the FBI, AEC, FAA, Postal and Customs Services are occupied processing
requests for information within the new time constraints. Id. at 117. The agencies who
saw calamity ahead got little sympathy from spokesmen for the public sector, whose
reactions can be summed up by an old observation of Nader's that the agencies have
ample time to respond to requests from their friends. Nader, supra note 28, at 10-12.
109. William Simon, when Federal Energy Administrator, promised that his agency
would acknowledge requests in 24 hours, give an answer in 10 days and rule on an ap-
peal within another 10 days. Senate Report, supra note 107, at 26. A number of agencies
were already in substantial compliance.
110. Id. at 24.
111. Amendments, supra note 8, § l(c)(6)(A), (B), (C).
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for "unusual circumstances" either during the initial or appellate re-
view periods. Circumstances are unusual when the search must be
made at field offices, a voluminous amount of separate records is in-
volved in a single request or consultation with another agency is re-
quired. Talking with the agency's legal staff or the Department of
Justice is not grounds for an extension. If an agency misses a deadline,
the petitioner is deemed to have exhausted the administrative remedies
and may proceed to court.
The Amendments also expedite court review by requiring the agency
to make a responsive pleading within 30 days after being served.112
Except as to "cases the court considers of greater importance," the
district court may give cases under the Act precedence on the docket
and shall conduct a hearing at "the earliest practicable date." 1 3 On a
showing of "exceptional circumstances," a court may allow an agency
which is demonstrating "due diligence" more time to complete a re-
view of its records.11
2. Individual and Agency Responsibility. To provide incentive to
disclose, the officials who make the decisions may no longer remain
anonymous. They must now attach their names and titles to each
denial."15 Nor is a routine denial a safe course. If a court makes a
written finding that agency personnel acted "arbitrarily or capricious-
ly" in withholding information, "the Civil Service Commission shall
promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary ac-
tion is warranted . .. ." The Commission's findings and recommenda-
tions are referred back to the agency for "corrective action." 1 6 Sus-
pensions probably will be few and far between. 1 7 The mere fact that
112. Id. § 1(b)(4)(C).
113. Id. § I(b)(4)(D).
114. Id. § 1(c)C6)(C).
115. Id.
116. Id. § l(b)(4)(F). The Act has always authorized a contempt citation against any
official who did not carry out a court order. See p. 744 supra. No instances of adminis-
trative discipline against an official who refused without a basis in law to release in-
formation upon request were cited in the hearings. The reverse has, however, occurred.
The Office of Economic Opportunity suspended an employee because he allegedly re-
leased information about teachers' salaries at a private day care center. Statement by
Ronald Plesser, House Hearings, supra note 34, at 349. Fifteen state information acts
include criminal penalties. See Senate Report, supra note 107, at 63-64.
117. The Senate draft would have permitted the court to impose a 60-day suspension
when information was withheld without reasonable basis in law. S. 2543, supra note 49, §
(b)(2)(4)(F). This approach raised question in some minds as to whether the employee
would receive due process in a civil action brought to force disclosure of information
rather than to punish him. Office of Rep. John N. Erlenborn, Kennedy Provision Would
Wreck Information Bill, Press Release, Aug. 12, 1974. While the safeguards of notice and
opportunity to be heard were preserved in the draft, the channeling of the matter into
the regular disciplinary procedures with which all federal employees are familiar seems a
preferable approach. It is likely to achieve the legislative objective, it avoids the pitfalls
which await any statute that imposes new and untested sanctions, and it is fairer to give
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a denial is reversed by a court does not require a disciplinary response.
The official's action must be found to be arbitrary or capricious. In
fiduciary law these terms, when used in a will or trust instrument,
significantly enlarge the trustee's discretion. 118 Even if the preliminary
threshhold is surmounted, the Commission may not find cause for
discipline. It is, after all, itself an agency and may be expected to
have a measure of sympathy for employees." 9 But whether anyone is
suspended or not, the threat of sanctions must dramatically influence
the whole psychology of the process. The first instinct cannot be to
deny and hide. It will now be to disclose or find a higher official to
take responsibility for the denial.
The agencies must also stand up and be counted, literally. By March
1 of each year they are required to report to Congress the number of
and reasons for denials of requests for information, number and dis-
position of appeals from denials, names of persons responsible for de-
nials, disciplinary action taken against any officials, relevant agency
rules, a fee schedule for charges made for search and reproduction
of records and the amounts collected, and any other information which
demonstrates their efforts to administer the Act.' 20 In addition, the
Department of Justice must summarize all court cases arising under
the Act and efforts taken by the Department to "encourage agency
compliance."' 21
3. Complainant's Fees and Court Costs. It is estimated that it costs
at least $1,000 in attorney's fees and court costs to secure a judicial re-
view of a denial. 122 Such obstacles are inconsistent with the theory that
nonprivileged information belongs to the citizens. The Amendments re-
affirm that right by authorizing the court to assess against the govern-
ment reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in a case in which the
complainant has "substantially prevailed."' 23 The fees are paid by the
Treasury and not by the agency; plainly the objective is to encourage
the employee a hearing in which his conduct in office is the sole issue. In this instance
the conference committee paid some heed to President Ford who had written: "Further-
more, placing in the judiciary the requirement to initially determine the appropriateness
of an employee's conduct and to initiate discipline is both unprecedented and unwise."
Veto Message, supra note 61, at 1061.
118. 3 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 187, at 1501-09 (3d ed. 1967).
119. During the hearings one witness described the Civil Service Commission: "There
is no more outrageous agency in this city from the standpoint of coverup than the Civil
Service Commission." Testimony of Clark Mollenhoff, House Hearings, supra note 24, at
42.
120. Amendments, supra note 8, § 3(d).
121. Id.
122. See House Hearings, supra note 24, at 346.
123. Amendments, supra note 8, § 1(b)(2)(4)(E).
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people to seek information rather than to levy an additional punish-
ment against an uncooperative agency. 24
4. Search and Copying Fees. A table of agency fees for the produc-
tion of documents listed the cost per page of photocopy as running
from $0.05 at the Agriculture Department to $1 at Selected Service
and the charge for clerical search varying among the agencies any-
where from $2 to' $5 an hour.125 Separate stories were also heard at
the hearings of one agency request for $85,000 and another for a pre-
payment of $20,000 to offset the costs of a preliminary search. 26 The
amended Act continues to leave it to the discretion of each agency
to set uniform fees but requires that they be limited to "only the di-
rect costs of such search and duplication." In addition, the agency is
to furnish documents at reduced or no charge when "the information
can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public."'127 Each
agency must give an accounting to Congress every year as to fees col-
lected,128 which suggests that Congress intends to police any derelic-
tions from the standards set out in the Act.
124. A number of important statutes make allowance for fees and costs to be paid by
the federal government in efforts to encourage private litigation to vindicate national
policy. Indeed, attorney fees have been awarded against the federal government even
though not authorized by statute when the action has furthered congressional policy and
been a financial burden. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Gen-
erally, however, an award of fees requires statutory authorization; cf. West Central Mo.
Rural Dev. Corp. v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973). Congress has sometimes on
occasion authorized the payment of fees. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a 3(b),
2000e 5(k) (1970); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); Clean Air Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h 2(d) (1970). One witness suggested a difference between such
statutes and the Freedom of Information Act, however. In areas such as civil rights, the
conditions which give rise to the litigation have been created by external forces beyond
the parties' control. Under the Act, an attorney can make any number of requests hoping
that one will be refused under circumstances which will give rise to a reversal and an
award of fees. "The award of attorneys fees is particularly inappropriate in a type of
litigation which can be started by anyone without the customary legal requirements of
standing or interest or injury. Some lawyers might take turns in filing these suits for each
other." Statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., House Hearings, supra note 24, at 124-25.
But manufacturing Information Act cases is an unlikely source of income: The award
of fees is not automatic. The court in determining fees will be governed by considerations
of need and public benefit resulting from the disclosure. The Senate bill had set criteria
to guide the court in awarding fees, including benefit to the public, commercial benefit
to the plaintiff, and whether the government's withholding "had a reasonable basis in
law." S. 2543, supra note 49, § l(b)(4)(E). President Ford expressed the hope that "corpo-
rate interests will not be subsidized in their attempts to increase their competitive posi-
tion by using the Act." Letter to Conference Chairman, supra note 67. The Conference
Report removed the criteria as unnecessary because existing law recognized such factors
and the criteria "may be too delimiting." Conference Report, supra note 104, at 10.
125. See Table of Fees for the Production of Documents, House Hearings, supra note
24, at 92.
126. Senate Report, supra note 107, at 11.
127. Amendments, supra note 8, § l(b)(4)(A).
128. Id. § 3(d)(6).
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C. An Expanded Definition and Additional Indexing Requirement
1. Scope of the Act. An agency is defined in the Amendments to
mean "any executive department, military department, Government
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establish-
ment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Execu-
tive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency.'1 2
The Amendment thus codifies the definition set out in Soucie v.
David 30 that an agency is any administrative unit with independent
authority to exercise specific functions and makes it clear that the Act
applies to the Postal Service and to other publicly funded corpora-
tions. 1 1 The parenthetical in the definition suggests the possibility
of a citizen making claims to tapes, letters and memoranda of some
future President. The Conference Report disavows any such intent:
The term "Executive Office of the President" is not to include the
President's immediate personal staff whose "sole function is to advise
and assist the President.' ' 32
2. Publication of Indexes. Under the original Act the agencies were
required to make available for inspection opinions, statements of poli-
cy and staff manuals and instructions that affect the public. 33 The
right to inspect is of limited value if the existence of the document
is unknown. The Amendments now require the agencies to maintain
an index identifying such documents and to publish and distribute
copies of such index at least quarterly. 34 If an agency feels that its
work may not be of sufficient public interest to justify the cost of
publishing and distributing an index, it may give notice that it will
not publish its index but copies thereof must be made available
upon request at cost."a'
Conclusion
The amended Act will affect fundamentally the way we govern our-
selves. The individual citizen, either alone or in conjunction with
others who share his concern, now has substantial access to informa-
tion which was previously the exclusive possession of the handful of
administrators who made the decisions on our behalf.
129. Id. § 3(e).
130. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
131. Conference Report, supra note 104, at 14-15.
132. Id. at 15.
133. 5 US.C. § 552(a)(2)(A), (B), (C) (1970).
134. Amendments, supra note 8, § 1(a).
135. Id.
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The nation has before it a series of awesome problems involving
national priorities. The alternatives are seldom appealing. The fuel
crisis, for instance, poses to the ordinary citizen the choice of either
paying an extorted price for foreign oil, which, he is told, may cause
the collapse of the world economy, or of devel 9ping alternative sources
of energy which opens up no less grim visions of runaway reactors,
polluted air, contaminated beaches and unsettled ecology. There are
studies in government files which shed light on these problems. They
cannot be expected to give final answers. Indeed, because such studies
are frequently technical, fragmented and conflicting in their judg-
ments, disclosure may involve a risk that the issues will be misunder-
stood. Nevertheless, as a democracy, we are committed to the propo-
sition that the people must decide where the truth lies. The experi-
ence of the Viet Nam War is a reminder of the calamitous conse-
quences of secret decisionmaking. James Madison warned: "A popular
government without popular information or the means of acquiring
it is but a prologue to farce or tragedy or perhaps both."'130 As a na-
tion we have come perilously close in the last decade to demonstrating
the truth of his prophecy, but the tragedy of Viet Nam and the farce
of Watergate emboldened Congress first to enact and then to strengthen
the Freedom of Information Act. The public now has at least one way
to attempt to hold its government accountable.
136. Quoted in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 US. 73, 110-11 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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